A Response to Professor I. Glenn Cohen\u27s Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests by Alvare, Helen M.
University of Minnesota Law School 
Scholarship Repository 
Minnesota Law Review: Headnotes 
2012 
A Response to Professor I. Glenn Cohen's Regulating 
Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests 
Helen M. Alvare 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/headnotes 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alvare, Helen M., "A Response to Professor I. Glenn Cohen's Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with 
Best Interests" (2012). Minnesota Law Review: Headnotes. 18. 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/headnotes/18 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review: Headnotes collection by an authorized administrator of the 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
  
8 
Response 
A Response to Professor I. Glenn Cohen’s 
Regulating Reproduction: The Problem 
with Best Interests 
Helen M. Alvaré† 
[I]f the kids are still alive when my husband gets home from work, 
then hey, I’ve done my job. 
  -Roseanne Barr1 
 
Professor Glenn Cohen makes a tight logical case against 
employing a simple “best interests of the resulting child” 
(BIRC) argument to justify a variety of laws designed to affect 
whether, when and with whom a person procreates.2 He shows 
that—given how such laws could result in a particular child not 
being conceived at all, or in the creation of a different child at 
another time—it is not possible to support such laws on literal 
BIRC grounds separate from the claim that it is better for a 
particular child never to be born at all.3 This is the “non-
identity problem.”4 Professor Cohen further claims that the law 
in a “cognate area,”5 has essentially rejected the notion that it 
would be better for a particular child never to have been born; 
this is the set of cases usually denominated “wrongful life” 
suits, in which courts most often refuse to recognize a cause of 
action for the “wrong” of simply having life. He points out that 
at least one court has highlighted additionally the practical im-
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. 
The author is grateful to the Minnesota Law Review and to Professor Cohen 
for this opportunity to engage the important and challenging ideas set out in 
Professor Cohen’s article. Copyright © 2012 by Helen M. Alvaré. 
 1. Roseanne Barr Quotes, BRAINY QUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/ 
quotes/authors/r/roseanne_barr.html (last visited May 20, 2012).  
 2. I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best In-
terests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423 (2011).  
 3. Id. at 457.  
 4. Id. at 437.  
 5. Id. at 443. 
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possibility of determining whether the plaintiff (the child claim-
ing that but for a doctor’s error he or she would never have 
been born, and seeking damages for the harm of being alive) 
has been damaged at all.6  
At the very least, Professor Cohen’s article suggests that 
lawmakers would be inconsistent simultaneously to support 
courts’ refusals to recognize the “wrongful life claim” and to en-
dorse a literal BIRC rationale for one or more laws likely lead-
ing to the nonexistence of a particular child. Given that few, if 
any, persons would like to be associated with the declaration 
that a particular child’s life is “not worth living,” the practical 
result of Professor Cohen’s argument is that laws and policies 
embodying even widely popular opinions about favorable condi-
tions for childbearing, lose a powerful rhetorical device: BIRC.  
Professor Cohen is correct about the widespread and ex-
plicit use of BIRC in order to justify laws and private policies 
ranging from incest prohibitions, to constraints upon access to 
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), to abstinence educa-
tion (and he might well have added to the list those sex educa-
tion programs receiving the vast majority of federal support, 
“comprehensive sex education” programs).7 He is also accurate 
in concluding that the non-identity problem essentially logical-
ly forecloses employing the usual BIRC justification in the legal 
and policy contexts he raises. His paper also, if only indirectly, 
suggests a proposition that is welcome from a human rights 
perspective: that it is best to conclude that human beings have 
lives worth living, no matter their origin. Undoubtedly there 
remains a connection in the mind of the average citizen, be-
tween exhortations from the state to avoid childbearing in “X” 
situation, and the perception that children nevertheless born in 
“X” situation have less dignity or merit less care. This is an af-
front to equality and ought to be fought explicitly. Of course, at-
tempts to solve this equality problem can go too far, to the point 
of deeming all sexual or technological transactions resulting in 
the conception of children beyond comment or regulation—no 
matter the harms suffered by the adults involved, or the impli-
cations for long-held standards regarding adults’ responsibili-
ties to children generally. These latter standards would include 
 
 6. Id. at 445. 
 7. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 
Stat. 3034 (2009); see also News Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
HHS Awards Evidence-Based Teen Pregnancy Prevention Grants (Sept. 30 
2010) available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/09/20100930a.html. 
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at least the family law norm holding that parents’ rights re-
specting their children are a function of parents’ prior duties, 
along with its further specification: parents’ continuing legal 
rights respecting their children depend upon maintaining pa-
rental “fitness,” i.e., certain minimum levels of behavior affect-
ing children.  
It is more than a little likely, in fact, that lawmakers’ near-
ly constant invocations of BIRC in connection with regulations 
affecting procreation are intended to point to these norms, and 
not meant as a mechanical rule. In other words, one possible, 
even likely “read” of the practice of using BIRC to justify laws 
and policies which would almost certainly preclude the birth of 
a particular child, is as the state’s way of communicating to 
those who could be parents, always to put children’s interests 
before adults’ in situations wherein adults are so empowered. 
Obviously, the moment of conception is a situation in which 
would-be parents are almost always so empowered. It is a mo-
ment in time where there either are or are not in place many of 
the basic conditions understood historically (and increasingly 
affirmed by current empirical research) as linked to children’s 
well-being. Some of these basic conditions can be deduced from 
the laws and policies Professor Cohen highlights, for example, 
abstinence education, incest bans, and limits or regulations 
concerning assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs).8 They in-
clude, generally speaking, marriage, and age and economic fac-
tors which often go hand in hand. Likely rationales for these 
conditions include the research findings that when natural 
parents are not married to one another, there is more instabil-
ity in children’s lives.9 Furthermore, with unmarried biological 
parents, whether conception occurred naturally or via ARTs, 
children are more likely to be deprived of a relationship with 
one or both biological parent(s) for some part or all of their 
lives. When prospective parents are quite young, there are well-
founded concerns about their ability to obtain adequate em-
ployment or education for purposes of supporting a child. When 
they are relatively old (in the case of some seeking access to 
ARTs), there arise questions about how long they can fulfill pa-
rental duties. If would-be parents are close kin, the law worries 
 
 8. Cohen, supra note 2, at 446–457.  
 9. See, e.g., W. BRADFORD WILCOX, ET AL., WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: 
THIRTY CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (3d ed. 2011); Cynthia Os-
borne et al., Married and Cohabiting Parents’ Relationship Stability: A Focus 
on Race and Ethnicity, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1345 (2007).  
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not only about their children’s health, but also the problem of 
stable family life in a family of now confounded kin relations. 
All of these concerns are part of an increasingly visible legal 
and popular discourse about procreation; all can inform would-
be parents’ reflections at the moment of conception. Again, pre-
conception, it is the potential parents, as compared with any 
child, who have the power to affect the circumstances into 
which a child is born, which circumstances can affect the child’s 
flourishing permanently or for shorter or longer periods of time.  
The BIRC rationale for laws affecting procreation makes 
sense if understood as an exhortation to parents, pre-
conception, to “step up” to a level of “fitness” whereby children’s 
best interests come first, and parents’ rights follow only if they 
embrace this duty. Furthermore, such an understanding of 
BIRC would harmonize family law’s pre-conception and post-
birth treatment of parents, insofar as this is possible consider-
ing that children do not yet exist in the former case, but do in 
the latter. Post-birth, the law will not step in to remove a par-
ticular child (temporarily or permanently) from a particular 
parent—in other words, it will not step in to mold parenting—
unless the parent’s behavior falls below a floor demarcated by 
“neglect,” “abuse,” “abandonment” or other “unfitness.”10 Pre-
conception, the law will not speak to potential parents in a dis-
couraging or definitive way, will not instruct them in the de-
tails of adequate parenting, unless their “parenting behavior”—
by which I mean their conceiving their child in particular cir-
cumstances— falls below a floor constituted by the presence, at 
the time of conception, of a situation deemed minimally sup-
portive of the child’s best interests. At conception, there is no 
“track record” of parents’ interactions with a child by which to 
judge their conduct or fitness respecting a particular child; he 
or she does not exist yet. Observers can only judge persons’ 
suitability by the care they have taken at least to avoid depriv-
ing a child of some of the basic goods of family life. If none of 
these basic goods are lacking, the law remains silent. When 
basic goods may well be absent at the moment of conception, 
the law speaks. Of course, it cannot speak in the same way as it 
would when a child is actually born lacking basic goods. In this 
latter case, the law removes the child from the parents, some-
 
 10. These are commonly used statutory standards. See, e.g., National Dis-
trict Attorneys Association, Child Neglect and Abandonment Statutes 1 
(2007), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/ncpca_statute_child_neglect_ 
abandonment_3_07.pdf.  
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times temporarily, sometimes permanently. At conception, all 
the law can do is exhort (e.g., abstinence programs) or threaten 
with penalties (e.g., incest bans), or interpose practical hurdles 
(e.g., frighten off would-be sperm donors by requiring disclo-
sure) in order to begin to mold would-be parents into the kind 
of parents it will assume them to be after the child’s birth: “fit” 
parents who act in the child’s best interests.” This is the work 
presently performed or at least accompanied by the BIRC justi-
fication. How is it performed? In the case of persons who go 
forward to procreate a child in circumstances where it appears 
the child will be born deprived of one of the basic goods indicat-
ed by policies constraining procreation, the existence of the pol-
icy itself could help induce the parent(s) to later ameliorate the 
child’s experience by moving toward the ideal the policy advo-
cates. In the case of those who do not procreate at a particular 
time because of the existence of a policy constraining procrea-
tion, they might bring the law’s ideals to bear on their future 
procreating, or they might decide that they do not wish to meet 
the standards for “parental fitness” suggested or required by 
one or more parenting laws and policies, and choose not to pro-
create.  
This way of thinking about why the state imposes limits on 
whether, when and with whom a citizen can parent is, oddly 
enough, an answer to an age-old question asked by every par-
ent of a newborn on his or her way home from the hospital: 
“You mean I don’t need a license to have this baby? How can 
this be?” In other words, private and public policies affecting 
whether, when and with whom persons may procreate might be 
seen as a kind of licensing scheme. Immediately, however, it 
should be remarked that as far as licensing schemes go, this 
one is quite minimal. It operates more by exhortation than by 
penalty, and leaves more than a few decisions in the hands of 
private persons (e.g., ART providers) who are themselves sorely 
tempted to assist conception for a fee in a great variety of situa-
tions. Furthermore, often (not always, e.g., in the case of surro-
gacy contracts), this “licensing scheme” doesn’t actually deprive 
the person who can’t meet licensing conditions of the very thing 
the license was intended to gatekeep: a legal right to care and 
custody of a child. Still, it is important that society—whether 
the state or private parties—is not entirely silent about some of 
the minimal conditions for children’s flourishing pertaining to 
the moment of conception. Parenting is, with few exceptions 
(e.g., the care of a sick or disabled person over a long period of 
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time) the most dramatic experience a person might have of 
turning their life over to the needs of another person. While it 
is uniquely satisfying, it is also very difficult and demanding. I 
would argue that this is particularly true in a cultural envi-
ronment like ours which valorizes individualism and material 
success. Furthermore, the United States is witnessing a grow-
ing divide between the marriage and parenting experiences of 
more privileged versus less-privileged citizens.11 Better-off citi-
zens who act at conception in ways that deprive their children 
of some of the basic goods of family life can at least sometimes 
ameliorate outcomes for their children, in part, with money.12 
Poor or otherwise marginalized citizens do not have that op-
tion. For the benefit particularly of less-privileged citizens, 
then, it is good for both public and private actors to speak about 
conditions for “fit” parenting in order to provide less privileged, 
would-be parents standards to guide their striving, and to avoid 
intergenerational decline within marginalized groups. 
Understandably, a state purpose to help citizens consider 
what constitutes minimally fit parenting at the moment of pro-
creation will strike many as not only a surprising, but as an 
impermissible justification for law affecting whether, when and 
with whom a person procreates. Sex is today increasingly disso-
ciated both practically and conceptually from procreation. The 
widespread availability of birth control and abortion technolo-
gies partially explains this situation, as does the use of “priva-
cy” language in connection with the legal right to access both. 
Perhaps most important, however, is the rise of the notion that 
sexual decision making and decisions about procreation are, 
first and foremost, about identity formation, self-expression, 
and personal happiness. While the rise of this idea in the law 
merits its own article,13 it suffices for now to remark that the 
latter notion was endorsed explicitly in the Supreme Court’s 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey14 
(abortion) and Lawrence v. Texas15 (homosexual sexual inter-
 
 11. KAY S. HYMOWITZ, MARRIAGE AND CASTE IN AMERICA: SEPARATE AND 
UNEQUAL FAMILIES IN A POST-MARITAL AGE (2006); CHARLES MURRAY, COM-
ING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA 1960–2010 (2012) ; W. Bradford 
Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, NAT’L AFF., Fall 2009, at 81.  
 12. SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE 
PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS ( 1994).  
 13. I am currently drafting an article on this subject. 
 14. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 15. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
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course) decisions. In both opinions, the Court stated that mat-
ters involving sex and procreation: 
involve . . . the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, 
[and] . . .are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.16 
Any attempt by the state to intervene in the course of a 
person’s sexual expression or procreation will appear invalid ab 
initio within such a framework of ideas. Yet all the same, sex 
continues to be the cause of conception, both when women and 
men intend it to be, and when they do not. Numbers of unin-
tended pregnancies and nonmarital births remain quite high 
today.17 Furthermore, foundational aspects of children’s lives 
are determined by the parents’ situations at the moment of 
conception. Consequently, it is important for some authorita-
tive voice to point to the fact that conception is still the effective 
beginning of parenthood.  
I should note here that my suggestion that the state and 
some private actors (e.g., ART providers) have proposed mini-
mal standards for parental “fitness” at conception does not 
mean that these standards have been adopted or applied uni-
formly. There are many inconsistencies. For example, both 
state sponsored sex education programs and marriage pro-
grams speak about the advantages that married parents can 
offer to their children, but the law does nothing to discourage 
let alone forbid ART conceptions among singles or unmarried 
couples. Some jurisdictions or private providers will forbid as-
sisted reproduction by men who wish to remain permanently 
anonymous to their children, but most jurisdictions and provid-
ers impose no such condition. Furthermore, fathers who con-
ceive children naturally are often unknown to their children. 
Some jurisdictions may forbid surrogacy agreements which 
 
 16. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. In another relevant passage, the opinion com-
mends the legal availability of birth control and abortion in order to allow 
women to “define their view of themselves and their places in society.” Id. at 
856. 
 17. Lawrence B. Finer, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States: Inci-
dence and Disparities, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478 (2011); Brady E. Hamilton et 
al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2009, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Dec. 21, 2010, 
at 1, 4, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr59/nvsr59_03.pdf; 
see also STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, CHANGING PATTERNS OF NONMARITAL 
CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 6 (2009), available at http://www.cdc 
.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db18.pdf.  
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could separate a child from his or her genetic mother, but these 
same jurisdictions may allow the use of donor, eggs, sperm or 
embryos, which often produce the same result. Many factors 
undoubtedly account for the lack of consistency—profit motives 
and politics, to mention just two. Yet there are some more or 
less consistent themes around marriage, age, health and eco-
nomic circumstances which merit attention of the kind Profes-
sor Cohen and others have paid them.  
In sum, the BIRC rationale makes sense as a public and 
private effort—albeit neither a consistent nor a particularly ro-
bust effort—to remind parents, before the moment parenting 
begins (conception) to be what the law later (after-birth) needs 
them to be and assumes that they are: fit parents who act in 
their children’s best interests. It is not clear why policymakers 
use BIRC language when, because of the non-identity problem, 
it could not logically apply. But the historical reason is not ter-
ribly important. What matters is that the state find some way 
of expressing to adults that important aspects of a potential 
child’s future are established at the moment of conception. The 
child’s genetic makeup, the presence or absence of a stable rela-
tionship between his or her biological parents, the family’s eco-
nomic situation for at least some portion of the child’s minority, 
and other matters are discernible at the moment of conception.  
But what about the concern that BIRC-justified constraints 
might lead to disparaging children born into less than ideal sit-
uations? One of the helpful consequences of Professor Cohen’s 
analysis is that it requires us to face the possibility that when 
the state expresses a preference for one or another family form 
or formation process, there arises the risk that children created 
in the teeth of the state’s preferences will be stigmatized. One 
solution is for the state to stop speaking entirely about condi-
tions and environments better supporting children’s flourish-
ing, but this is ridiculous on its face, for the reasons suggested 
supra and for additional reasons. The state’s parens patriae 
role is longstanding and necessary. On matters of education 
and nutrition, for example, the state has and will continue to 
speak about what serves children and what hurts them. Cer-
tainly, matters concerning the circumstances of the child’s con-
ception are at least as important. It might be argued in re-
sponse that, historically, the circumstances of a child’s birth “go 
deeper” and are far more easily interpreted as a comment upon 
the child’s “quality” or future prospects, to the point where 
some might speak of children born in less-than-ideal circum-
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stances as having “lives not worth living.” This is true, but such 
a result is not inevitable. The currently reduced stigma con-
cerning nonmarital birth, for example, combined with the line 
of Supreme Court cases eradicating legal differences in the 
treatment of “legitimate” versus “illegitimate” children,18 
demonstrates the real possibility for maintaining a system 
where nonmarital births are still discouraged, but persons born 
outside of a marriage are recognized as fellow and equal citi-
zens. Even, however, if the announcement of standards for fit 
parenting is misused to disparage innocent children, the alter-
native state of affairs—silence about parental fitness—is unac-
ceptable. Conception is a crucial moment for children’s life 
courses, and those who would be parents may well benefit from 
this information. Furthermore, untried solutions await. Per-
haps the state could frame its BIRC arguments not in terms of 
“building better children,” but as exhortations to parents to 
begin molding themselves qua parents before undertaking the 
conception of children. This proposal is undoubtedly not in tune 
with the modern zeitgeist about sex, as noted above, but has the 
nice qualities of avoiding a colloquial BIRC justification when it 
is technically illogical, while at the same time forwarding the 
cause of children generally. 
A final note about this proposal in connection with Profes-
sor Cohen’s use of courts’ disposition of “wrongful life” cases; it 
is not undercut by family law’s admirable refusal to recognize a 
cause of action for “wrongful life.” It is a great good that, when 
confronted with a child who is already born, and is, for exam-
ple, severely disabled, the law refuses to declare his or her life 
“not worth living.” But this should not be confused with mes-
sages from the lips of public or private policymakers to the ef-
fect that, when it comes to children, parents should hold them-
selves to particular responsibilities not only after the child is 
born, but at any time when the parents can significantly impact 
the child’s best interests in the areas of physical health, family 
stability, future connections with genetic parents, etc. There is 
even some precedent for this thinking in those cases evaluating 
unmarried fathers’ interests in retaining parental status re-
specting their children. Courts require them to come forward to 
demonstrate that they assumed their responsibilities in a time-
ly manner.19 A father might even be required to have come for-
 
 18. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 19. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
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ward at the time he “knows or reasonably should have known 
about the pregnancy.”20 
  CONCLUSION   
Professor Cohen does not conclude that because a literal 
application of BIRC cannot logically do the work of justifying 
laws and policies banning, delaying or conditioning procreation, 
there is no rationale available to the state for regulating the 
circumstances of conception. This is salutary given that the lat-
ter conclusion would be tantamount to a suggestion that adults 
have something like a “right to a child.” This would be the prac-
tical result of affirming that there is no room even for exhorta-
tion from the state which might interfere with adults’ under-
taking procreative sex or ARTs whenever these would create a 
child with a life “worth living.” Yet it is well established in the 
law governing adoption, and in the area of surrogacy contracts, 
and even in parentage cases denying custody rights to genetic21 
or gestational22 progenitors , that family law has a tradition of 
putting children’s interests before adults’ in a wide variety of 
situations.  
Furthermore, to conclude that there is no rationale availa-
ble to the state for regulating the circumstances of conception 
would appear to contradict the notion that “fit parents can be 
presumed to act in their child’s best interests,” and to set up in 
its place a new principle we might call the “Roseanne Barr” 
rule: parents need attend only to their children’s bare exist-
ence. 
 
 20. In re Adoption of Michael H., 10 Cal. 4th 1043, 1054 (1995). 
 21. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 22. Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993). 
